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Argument
I. INTERPRETATION OF T W O CONFLICTING STATUTES

The First issue, and heart of this appeal, cannot be more simply stated than it has been by
Judge Kelly to Mr. Rupp, at the second evidentiary hearing regarding possession.
THE COURT: And I'm not talking about the merits of it, but we've got a
Defendant who says: Under 15 USC, section 1635, under Subpart - I think it's F that this Defendant had three years to seek to exercise a right of rescission.
In his motion for summary judgment, he claims to have exercised the right.
He shows documentation suggesting that he's rescinding under 15 USC Section
1635, and without getting to the merits, but hypothetically, if that motion were
granted and the whole transaction were set aside, then wouldn't you be in a
circumstance where Utah First would not be an owner under 78B-6-801 subpart 5,
who would be even entitled to rights under the Unlawful Detainer Statute?
Doesn't that motion go to the heart of whether you even have the right to exercise
those provisions?
He's suggesting - I've read the motion - he's suggesting that federal law
gives him a trump card, that in three years he can just rescind and if you - the
lender fails, within a certain period of time to respond, then the transaction is
rescinded and then your only remedy is not a remedy as an owner under the
statute, but would be of a judgment creditor who could sue him - that's at least
what he's arguing, correct?
MR. RUPP: Yes.
THE COURT: That you could at least - that he could at least - his
remedy - if his argument is accepted - and I'm making no statement as to whether
it would be - you haven't submitted your opposition, I understand that. But the
problem we have here, isn't it, that if his argument is accepted and he has properly
exercised the right to rescind and you have no rights as an owner under the
Unlawful Detainer Statute, then your only remedy would be to sue him for
damages, get a judgment and attempt to collect the judgment? Isn't that what he's
arguing?
MR. RUPP: If I can make sure I understand your question.
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. RUPP: You're saying if the Court agreed with Mr Dudley that he
had, in fact, properly rescinded this loan.
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THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. RUPP: Then we'd be in the situation where occupancy and
oossession has been granted to someone who doesn't own the property: is that
your question?
THE COURT: Right. Your whole right to give a credit bid or do
whatever." [R. 1249: Trans, beginning at Page 15, Line 25 through Page 17, Line
25., Addendum XIX]
We have asked this court for an interpretation of two conflicting laws, Utah's unlawful detainer
statute, 78B-6-801 etseq., and 15 U.S.C. § 1601 etseq. Dudley sufficiently marshaled all the facts
in support of this need for interpretation. This issue posed to this Court does not require us to revisit
all of the evidence presented in the trial court, nor does thefindingof the trial court need to be clearly
erroneous for this Court to find reversible error, in the form of de novo review of the trial court for
legal error. The standard of review for the interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which is
reviewed for correctness without any deference to the legal conclusions of the district court. See
Jaques v. Midway Auto Plaza, Inc., 2010 UT 54, \ 11, 240 P.3d 769. Again, Dudley's actions in
asserting federal protections, as defense to foreclosure, did not obligate Utah first to act
appropriately. Federal law obligates Utah First, and all who choose to profit from consumer credit
sales, to act appropriately. Judge Kelly further supports this position and states:
"If you are not the owner, and that's the issue that's been raised on summary
judgment, you would not even have the right to do anything under 78B-6-810,
okay?" [R. 1249: Trans, at Page 29, Line 5-8., Addendum XIX]
Utah First has failed to respond in any meaningful way to thefirstissue on appeal. Neither
have they offered any guidance on their interpretation of these two conflicting statutes. Therefore,
we can presume they have no alterative reading of the law, nor argument with our proffered
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interpretation. As such, this Court should find in favor of the Dudley's reversing the trial courts
decision as legal error, and award attorneys fee's and costs.
II. PROPER APPLICATION OF UTAH' S UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE
The Second issue is the natural extension of first. If the conflict outlined above could have
been resolved in Utah First's favor, then did the trial court properly apply Utah's Unlawful Detainer
Statute? The Appellee cites portions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-801 et seq., all of which only
bolster their case, without regard for the proper standard of review. Utah First contends that Dudley
failed to present this issue at trial, and can not now raise this issue. As stated above, from day one,
Dudley has argued that his interest in the property was not extinguished, and proper adjudication was
necessary, and proper adjudication could not be maintained under UTAH CODE ANN. 78B-6-801 et
seq. Plaintiff had no right to bring this action, and the venue was improper from day one.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78B-6-810(l)(a) simply states "the trial court shall expedite the

proceedings, including the resolution of motions and trial." The trial court failed to expedite the
resolution of any motions, at times failing to render a written decision and order, depriving Dudley
of his rights to an interlocutory appeal, and never rendering a decision on possession, which is the
limited scope by which Utah's unlawful detainer statute applies. Finally, Utah First states that the
case in question was an unlawful detainer, therefore UTAH CODE ANN. 78B-6-809(b) does not apply,
and proceeding under this statute was not barred. Utah First is quibbling regarding the statutes use
of forcible detainer, as if unlawful detainer is not interchangeable with forcible detainer. If someone
is guilty of forcibly detaining property, they would, in turn, be guilty of unlawful detainer.
Utah First asserts at page 25 of their brief that Dudley has failed to marshal the evidence in
support of his case. It seems that Utah First is arguing that properly marshaling the facts would
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require the Appellant to rewrite everything provided in the transcripts, as well as rewrite, verbatim,
the evidence before the court, as it seems this is what Utah First has done in their response. Dudley
sufficiently marshaled the evidence in support of his arguments, by not only providing this Court with
the hearing and trial transcripts from the inception of the case, but also providing the addendum,
which was filed separately due to the length. Utah First argues using Ostermiller v. Ostermillen 2010
UT 43, 233 P.3d 428. The ruling in Ostermiller, was a blatantly obvious lack of marshaling, where
the Appellant failed to even provide the court with a transcript. In Ostermillen the court held that
the Appellant "neither presented a transcript of the August 2006 or November 2006 trial, nor
indicated that a transcript contained evidence that would undermine the district court's
determination." 2010 UT 43, 233 P.3d 428. Dudley more than complied with the marshaling
requirements and this Court has the evidence before it to determine both statute interpretation and
clearly erroneous findings by the trial court.
This Court need only look to the docket for a cursory examination to determine if the trial
court applied §78B-6-810(a) without prejudice. The action was filed on March 29, 2010, and
Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw were entered August 23, 2010, spanning one hundred forty
eight (148) days. On April 16, 2010, Dudley filed a motion for summary judgment which was ruled
on June 14, 2010, sixty (60) days after it was filed. Despite the trial courts promise of "ultimately,
a short decision will issue on the matter," [R. 1253, Trans, at Page 4, Line 4-5] no written decision
or order issued to provide grounds for an interlocutory appeal. Likewise, on June 21, 2010, prior
to the start of trial, the Dudley's requested a continuance and filed two (2) motions in response to
Utah First's untimely disclosure of a slew of discovery documents, including thirty-five (35)
previously requested documents that Utah First refused to provide when requested, yet represented
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to the Court compliance with all prior discovery requests. This was only roughly thirty-six hours
before trial, which encompassed a weekend, but was not considered grounds to continue by the trial
court.
The first motion filed by Dudley was an Expedited Motion for Judicial Notice of Conflicting
Law and Presumptions. This motion was neither responded to, nor has the trial court formally ruled
on it. The second motionfiledby Dudley was a Motion to Re-Frame Trial Structure, Stay Damages,
and Supplement Jurisdiction, which motion was denied sixty-four (64) days later in the trial courts
finalfindings,after conclusion of trial. How can this be viewed as a timely resolution of all motions
under the unlawful detainer statute?
More importantly, did the Dudley's meet the standard of a defense to unlawful detainer as
outlined under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-809(2). Again, Utah First fails to respond in any material
way to this issue presented for review to this court, and as such should forfeit any relief from this
question. This Court should accept the Dudley's position that any Utah homeowner, similarly
situated, having lawfully disputed ownership, has the right to have that dispute decided prior to being
found guilty of unlawful detainer, not during or simultaneously with the unlawful detainer trial The
trial court's decision should be reversed and the Dudley's should be awarded reasonable attorney's
fees as well as the cost of this appeal.
III. THE TRIAL COURT W A S CLEARLY ERRONEOUS

The only issue Utah First seem's comfortable responding to is the issue that revolves around
the clearly erroneous standard of the trial court. Was the trial courts finding clearly erroneous? Utah
First has chosen to reiterate what has already been established rather than answer directly the question
placed before this Court. Utah First relies heavily upon the broad language of TILA, and ignores the
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specific detail laid out in TILA's implementing statute Regulation "Z" (12 CFR 226.1 et seq.) and
the Official Staff Commentary on Reg. Z, which is dispositive. The simple truth is that Dudley's
refinance does not fit specifically into one section of TIL A. Utah First would have you believe that
no disclosure was required, or the insufficient account of a non-liable third party should suffice as
evidence of disclosure. Utah First asserts that TILA is a disclosure statute only, so they can ignore
the provisions regarding the prompt return of unearned interest under 15 U.S. C. §1615(a), which is
titled Prompt Refund of Unearned Interest Required. Pursuant to 12 CFR §226.4(c)(7)(iv), a[w]hile
it is true that the regulations exempt the appraisal fee, it only does so if the fees are "bona fide and
reasonable in amount" Id atv §226.4(c)(7)" See Morris v. Novastar Mortgage, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 67015 Morris held that costs not found to be "bona fide and reasonable" are not exempt from
TILA's regulation and should be included in a determination of the finance charge. Interest charged
on unearned cost's, excluded from the finance charge, is unearned interest, required by TELA to be
promptly refunded.
Utah First would like this Court to believe that Dudley should be held to a higher standard
regarding his review of the pages and pages of loan documents, which were changed on the day of
closing. It does not matter the education or expertise a consumer has when the sufficiency of TDLA
mandated disclosures is determined from the standpoint of an ordinary consumer. That the Dudley's
were not confused misses the point. Whether a particular disclosure is clear for purposes of TDLA
is a question of law, and depends on the content of the form and not how it effects any particular
reader. TELA does not easily forgive technical errors, and the right to rescission encompasses a right
to return to the status quo that existed before the loan. These rights were written by Congress to
protect consumers from predatory lending.

Lenders have ample protection from borrowers
-6-
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attempting to defraud their institutions of cash.
Utah First misstates the facts on page 34 of their brief, wherein Utah First asserts that Ms.
Ellett testified that she had a "specific" recollection of the closing of Dudley's loan, therefore Dudley
was in receipt of the HUD-1 Settlement Statement Addendum, which lists the charge of $42.99. This
was not testified to, and there is no evidence in support of the finding that Dudley was in receipt of
the $42.99 disclosure, which constituted a finance charge, therefore, making the disclosures materially
incomplete pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1635(i). The exact testimony of Ms. Ellett is as follows:
MR. COREY: You've testified that you were present at Mr. Dudley's closing?
MS. ELLETT: Yes. I didn't close it at my office. I closed it at their Credit Union
office.
MR. COREY: Okay. Do you have an independent recollection of Mr. Dudley's closing?
MS. ELLETT: I remember doing the closing. I don't know if I could remember
every single detail of the closing, but general - pretty generally, yeah. [R. 1256 at
Page 118]
It is obvious from Ms. Ellett's testimony, that she had no specific recollection, as argued by Utah
First. Ms. Ellett's testimony was general, and she had a general recollection of the closing of the
Dudley's loan. The trial court erroneously ruled, without evidence or testimony, that the Dudley's
received the disclosure of the forty-two dollar ninety-nine cent "survey" fee, though not included in
the HUD 1, nor any proffer of a bill, statement, or receipt that it was actually paid to the party
alleged. This is a violation under TIL A, which would give rise to the extended right of rescission,
which Dudley exercised and Utah First ignored.
IV. RESCISSION
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Utah First asserts that Dudley's rescission is not valid, and not a valid defense to foreclosure.
This is Utah First's attempt to get this Court to overlook the real controversy between the parties.
According to the Center For Responsible Lending's Utah state foreclosure projection for 2009-2012,
the number of homeowners in foreclosure will exceed sixty-nine thousand, with an estimated
statewide lost home equity wealth due to nearby foreclosures in 2009-2012 of $5.7 billion. Members
of our community are faced with the question, are lenders really the best party to determine whether
consumers have been the victims of predatory lending, and was it Congresses intent in writing these
consumer protection, that the lenders should have the sole power to determine a consumer's right to
rescind.
Utah First cites four instructive cases in support of their theory that they have no obligation
under the law to respond to anything other than a "valid" rescission. We would add one more case
to their cacophony of support to a "valid" rescission. Slightly closer to the issue at hand, Kruse v.
Countrywide Home Loan Servicing, LP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108248, from the district court of
Colorado, which states:
"A plaintiff may seek damages for a creditor's failure to honor a valid rescission
request pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1640(a)(stating that 'any creditor who fails to
comply with any requirement imposed under [ 15 U.S.C. § 1635]... is liable to such
person... for statutory damages, including the costs of the action, together with a
reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court') For claims of failure to
effectuate rescission, the date of the occurrence oft he violation is the earlier of
when the creditor refuses to effectuate rescission, or twenty days after it receives
the notice of rescission. See In re Fox, 391 B.R. 772, 779 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ohio
2008); Tucker v. Beneficial Mortg. Co,, 437 F. Supp. 2d584 (E.D. Va. 2006);
Velazquez v. Home American Credit, Inc., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1048 (N.D. III.
2003) (stating that the statute of limitations begins to run from the date creditor
refuses to rescind)." (emphasis added)
We agree with Appellee's assertion that failure to respond to a rescission, after the merits have been
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determined by a trier of fact to be "valid", would be an egregious and willful violation of the law.
Kruse is instructive, in as much as, prior to declining to dismiss their claim for damages for failure to
effectuate rescission, the district court determined that the Kruse's loan was a purchase money loan
without a statutory right of rescission. Utah First cannot rely upon any of those cases as a defense
to their current position, that as the party accused of predatory practices they have full authority to
invalidate and deny the Dudley's claim for rescission. Utah First failed to respond and unilaterally
proceeded to non-judicial foreclosure. There is no statutory provision nor case law to support the
notion that a lender is granted any legal authority to determine the merits of a consumer's claim for
rescission, not respond, and press forward with non-judicial foreclosure. Conversely, on May 6,
2011, in federal case no. 2:ll-cv-00402, after a hearing and testimony, Judge Clark Waddoups
granted a preliminary injunction to a consumer alleging TILA violations, stating in the order "the
irreparable injury here is the sale of Plaintiffs primary residence, which has been found to be
irreparable." In the instant case, Dudley's claim for rescission was admittedly received by Utah First
on February 2, 2010. [R.1256 at Page 138-139] Utah First failed to respond, and the trial court
determined Dudley to have no right of rescission past the three day standard right on August 23,
2010. [R. 1202,Conclusions of Law, Page 7, Paragraph 6]. Determination of a dispute, nearly six
months later, cannot and should not excuse a violation of federal law. Courts of equity do not allow
wrong doers to profit from violations of the law, and this should be applied accordingly to this case.
It is commonly held in many areas of the law, including TILA, that the violation occurs at the time
of the offense, not in relation to some later determination which may or may not ratify such violation
as a now non-violation. Utah First's self serving position that "there is no legal authority requiring
a lender to release its interest or take any action whatsoever following an invalid attempt at
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rescission," is a ridiculous argument at best. Of course there is no legal authority which would
require any party, now lawfully determined to be within their legal right to comply with the wishes
of the party now determined not to have those rights. Moreover, the assertion that no legal authority
exists which governs creditor behavior in instances such as this is utterly false. In a recent decision,
the United States Court of Appeals held that :
"The district court did not evaluate whether the defendants' failure to timely rescind
the mortgage transaction amounted to a separate violation of § 1635(b), which is
actionable under 1640(a). See In re: Smith, 737 F.2d at 1552. When a borrower
exercises a valid right to rescission, the creditor must take action within twenty days
after receipt of the notice of rescission, returning the borrower's money and
terminating its security interest. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b). Failure to do so
constitutes a separate violation of TILA, actionable under § 1640. Therefore, the
one-year limitations period for violation of § 1635(b) claims runs from twenty days
after the plaintiff gives notice of rescission. See Belini v. Wash.mut.bank, FA, 412
F.3d 17, 26 (1 st Cir. 2005)(holding that though the plaintiffs had conceded that their
disclosure-based TILA claims were time barred, the statute of limitations had not yet
run on claims arising out of noncompliance with § 1635(b)'s twenty-day
requirement.). Frazile alleged that in November 2008 she exercised her statutory right
to rescind and that the defendants' failed to timely respond. Frazile then filed this
action on June 15, 2009. Thus, Frazile's cause of action for an adequate response to
her notice of rescission is not time barred." Frazile v. EMC Mortgage Corp., 382
Fed. Appx. 833: 2010 U.S. App LEXIS 11931.

Federal law, under both 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. and 12 C.F.R. Part 226, exists for this purpose, and
Utah First should have complied in all respects, and their failure to do so should have been a bar to
this action.

V. CONCLUSION

Finally, while Utah First has attempted to re-frame the issues in their response, their argument
remains the same. Simply put, Utah First is asking this Court to over look their many violations of
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state and federal law, because they are so very minor in comparison to the amount of money they are
trying to collect. Despite being admittedly aware of the Dudley's claim for rescission in February of
2010, Utah First ignored UTAH CODE ANN. 78B-6-807(l)(a) and (b) which states, u[t]he plaintiff, in
his complaint: shall set forth the facts on which he seeks to recover; [and] may set forth any
circumstances of fraud, force, or violence which may have accompanied the alleged forcible entry,
or forcible or unlawful detainer;" and choose not to seek a determination or recovery on the question
of rescission, claiming it was not part of the same case and controversy. Utah First's argument that
refusal to respond to any of Dudley's valid and legal written requests, prior to proceeding to nonjudicial foreclosure, should be overlooked because the amount of money risked by the lending
institution, is ludicrous. The lending institution was responsible for the review and underwriting of
the loan, and Utah First specifically used the higher appraisal in pursuit of lending those funds to
Dudley. This contract was not a one way transaction, wherein Utah First had no obligation to make
material disclosures.
The facts are simple, and have been established. Dudley rescinded his loan as early as
February 10, 2010. Dudley had an extended right to rescind his loan due to the lack of material
disclosures made to Dudley by Utah First. Even the trial court stated in their Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law that "the paperwork behind the loan from Utah First to Dudley is not worth of
imitation." Utah First failed to respond, in any fashion, to the rescission of the loan, and unilaterally
proceeded with a non-judicial foreclosure, subsequently filing an unlawful detainer action. The
unlawful detainer action was not the proper venue for the dispute between the parties, and the action
is barred by statute, and interpretation of these conflicting statutes in necessary. Dudley was deprived
his federal rights, as well as his rights to appeal, due to the legal error and clearly erroneous findings
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by the trial court.
DATED this 26th day of July, 2011.

Clayne I. Corey
Attorney jor Appellant/Defendant

\
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